
Introducing the Common Non-Functional Ontology

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Enterprise systems interoperability is impeded by the lack of a cohesive, integrated perspective on non-functional aspects (NFA). We propose to respond to the fragmentation in NFA research by supporting a shared, common understanding. For this purpose:- first, we propose a common NFA ontology, which generalizes and integrates the different non-functional aspects under a common top-level ontology. Second, we introduce a series of specialized ontologies on specific non-functional aspects, such as trust, risk, privacy, threat and misuse. By fostering a consensual and shared view of the non-functional aspects domain, we aim to move closer to enhancing semantic enterprise interoperability. This shared perspective on *what* non-functional aspects are and *how* they relate to the other 'functional' aspects of enterprise systems, is the key towards enterprise interoperability.

1 Introduction

Non-functional aspects (NFAs) have a key role in establishing, conducting and maintaining inter-enterprise interoperability [1]. The ill-toned naming of these properties reflects well the neglect they have long suffered in software design and development. Issues related to such aspects like trust, security, privacy, contracts or quality of service are often left unaddressed till late in the software development process. However, in the context of enterprise interoperability, these aspects and the organisational policies that they form span across a wide range of business activities. Therefore, they must be considered and integrated into the enterprise system modeling, along with the other

traditionally accepted 'functional aspects'. In this respect, some of the key research problems identified are:

- Existence of a fragmented definition of *what* non-functional aspects are.
- Unclear vision on *how*, *when* or *where* these aspects should be integrated into the enterprise system modelling.

To resolve the above mentioned issues, we first need to establish a shared understanding of *what* Non-Functional Aspects are, *how* they influence the business processes and *how* they should be connected to the business models. One such way would be to capture the aforementioned knowledge as an ontology. Gruber's [5] definition of an ontology states: *Ontology is a specialization of a conceptualisation*. The fundamental objective behind the design of ontology is to conceptualise the domain of interest. Some other objectives for designing and using ontologies have been put forward by Noy and McGuinness [13] as:

- To make explicit implicit domain knowledge.
- To promote easy and shared understanding.
- To support reusability and interoperability.

Thus, the research problem addressed in this paper is on capturing and making explicit the implicit knowledge surrounding the non-functional aspects. We propose to capture and represent this shared conceptualisation as a set of ontologies. The researchers involved in this conceptualisation are experts from different non-functional aspect domains. Thus, the proposed ontologies are in themselves a product of consensus. We discuss more on our research methodology in Section 2. In this paper, we propose a Common NFA Ontology as a top level generic ontology, to which a number of individual Non-Functional ontologies are related. Our research has led us to establish a number of individual Non-Functional ontologies like trust, privacy, threat and misuse, information security, quality of service, digital rights management, business contracting, contract-related risks and so on. However, due to limitation of space, we present an overview of only a selected number of these.

The focus of this paper is to introduce the top level generic ontology - the Common NFA Ontology. We exemplify the utility of the proposed Common NFA ontology by describing how it is "specialised" in the individual sub ontologies. Note that the description given for each of the sub ontology is neither complete or exhaustive, but only an illustrative extract of the main concepts from each of them. We begin by a short discussion on our research methodology including the ontology design strategy adopted in Section 2. We present the Common NFA Ontology in Section 3. We present the overview of the Trust Ontology in Section 3.1, Threat and Misuse Ontology in Section 3.2, Business Contract Risk Ontology in Section 4, and Privacy Ontology in Section 5. We discuss the results and utility of our work in Section 6 and conclude in Section 7.

2 Research Methodology

To the best of our knowledge, no previous research exists that captures and models the different non-functional aspects within one common ontology. Our collective group of expert researchers carried out a state-of-the-art research survey for the different non-functional aspects. Initial results were published in TG7 Roadmap [1]. To analyse and represent the gathered knowledge, we reviewed different ontology design methodologies like those proposed by Gruninger and Uschold [17], Noy and McGuinness [13], Guarino [6], Fernandez et al. [3] and Nicola and Missikoff [2]. We found the UPON methodology, based on the Unified Software Development Process [9], simple to adopt within the diverse group of researchers, most of whom were not ontology experts. A first sketch of each of the non-functional aspects was carried out using the storyboard writing phase as proposed by the UPON. Next, a common template for capturing the main concepts, definitions and relationships to generate a glossary (again UPON) was suggested. A main instrument in the methodology of our work was a case study scenario of a typical enterprise system, which was carefully analysed from different non-functional aspect perspectives. Based on initial results of this analysis and further discussions, a first preliminary conceptual model for each individual sub ontology was proposed. After this 'glossary' building phase, the work was again reviewed for duplicacy and redundancy. Building on the case study analysis, detailed conceptual models for each of the sub ontologies was constructed.

3 Introducing the Common NFA Ontology

Our approach is to reuse existing ontologies as far as possible. Therefore, we chose to begin our work on the Common NFA Ontology by basing it on another accepted specification, namely the Business Motivation Model(BMM) [4]. Some of our reasons for choosing this particular standard may be summarised as:

- BMM identifies factors that motivate and influence a business enterprise and its goals.
- BMM identifies key business concepts like actors and business elements that are influenced by the above mentioned factors.
- BMM relates the key relationships between the influencing factors and the business concepts.

All the above reasons are useful in defining how non-functional aspects (influencing factors) may have an impact on or be related to the identified key business concepts.

In Figure 1 we see the conceptual model of our Common NFA Ontology. As said before, the Common NFA Ontology extends the basic BMM.(The shaded




Fig. 1. Common NFA Ontology- Conceptual Model

concepts are those that have been introduced by us). We begin by first reviewing some of the existing concepts defined in BMM and thereafter, proceed to the new additions. We use the `type text font` to denote concept classes. Stereotypes of the Common NFA used in the sub ontologies also include the parent class in paranthesis, wherever applicable, if not stated explicitly.

3.1 BMM Revisited

A basic notion in BMM (Figure 1) is that of a `goal`, which expresses something a business seeks to accomplish, a desired future state of affairs or condition. Examples of goals are being the market leader in an industry or having a profit of more than one million euros. Furthermore, there are `means`, i.e. something that can be used to achieve a goal. `Means` can take different forms, they can be instruments, devices, capabilities or methods. A `means` states what an `organisation` will do or use to achieve a `goal`, while a `goal` tells what the `organisation` views as desirable. There are two main kinds of `means`, `course of action` and `directive` such as `business rules` and `policies`. Then there are `influencers`, i.e. things that can impact an enterprise in its employment of `means` or achievement of `goals`. Note that an `influencer` expresses an objective state of affairs, it just exists, and there is nothing the `organisation` can do about this. In contrast, a `goal` is something that an `organisation` decides about - it wants to accomplish the `goal`. Similarly, a `means` is something that the `organisation` chooses itself - it decides to use a `means` to achieve a `goal`. it is useful to distinguish between two types of influencers, `external` and `internal`. An `external influencer` exists outside the organisational boundaries of an enterprise, e.g. a competitor that is taking

market shares from an enterprise. There are also **internal influencers** that exist within an enterprise. It could be a habit, i.e. a customary practice or use. **Influencers** can be positive or negative, they can make it easier or more difficult to achieve a **goal**. In fact, the same **influencer** may make it easier to achieve one **goal** and at the same time make it more difficult to achieve another **goal**. In order to tell how an **influencer** impacts a **goal** or a **means**, we use **assessments**. For example, we say that an influencer is a **threat** for achieving a certain **goal**, or an **opportunity** to employ a certain **means**. Other examples are **strengths** and **weaknesses**.

3.2 Common NFA Ontology

We begin by introducing the concept of **business object** in the Common NFA. **Business objects** refer to any object or resource that is of some value to an organisation. For examples- goods or services that are being traded, purchase orders, contracts, customers and ERP systems. **Business objects** also include less tangible objects like data, information and digital rights. **Business process** acts on or utilises or consumes or produces these **business objects**. Therefore, these **business objects** undergo some change of state, which we can qualitatively or quantitatively measure, to result in a **state of affairs**. Some states of affairs are planned and desired like **goals**, whereas other **state of affairs** are unplanned and even unwanted such as quality deficiencies and business damages. **Business process** are affected by internal as well as external **influencers**, therefore the **business objects** are also affected. Non-Functional Aspects like trust, risk, quality of service are all kinds of **influencers**. These influencers act indirectly to produce undesirable effects on the expected outcome of business processes, thereby affecting the goals for an organisation. Hence, it is required to assess whether this **state of affairs** is desired or not. For this purpose, we introduce the notion of a **valuation** in the Common NFA ontology. A **valuation** is usually done by an **organisation**, but it may also be done by an outside (external) agent. The **valuation** is an evaluation done on a **business object**, its current state and its planned state to give a **value result**. For example, if the goal had been to increase sales by ten percent and the current monthly balance sheet indicates a loss of five percent, then the **valuation** would provide the evaluated **value result** that there is a net loss and no growth in sales. If the **value result** indicates that the current **state of affairs** is undesirable or unacceptable then appropriate measures need to be set in motion to counteract these ill-effects. This is decided by a **business decision**. The **business decision** is a central concept in our Common NFA Ontology. The **business decision** is based on the **valuation**, the prescribed set of **goals**, available **means** and the expected **state of affairs**. The **business decision result** of such organisational decision making could involve a change in **policy**, **directive**, adoption of some new **means**. These are termed as **countermeasures**. The **countermeasure**

has to realise the **business decision result**, that is, it imposes some modified requirements on the enterprise. We introduce a **countermeasure** option as a kind of **means** that an **organisation unit** may adopt to specifically address any negative **potential impact** that any **internal or external influencer** may produce on the defined **Objectives and Goals**. Positive impacts, that is, **potential awards** are also incentives or factors that influence **business goals and policies**. In most non function aspect scenarios, it is the incentive of **potential awards** that motivate an enterprise, like improved customer satisfaction leading to more revenue is the **potential award** for implementing better quality of service(non-functional aspect). We see, thus, that the non-functional aspects often lead to qualitative performance indicators rather than quantitative aspects.

We shall in the following sections, present some of the non-functional aspects as individual ontologies.

4 Trust Ontology




Fig. 2. Excerpt from Trust Ontology

The first subontology describes the multifaceted phenomenon of **trust** between **organisations**. **Trust** has business relevance to an **organisation** in

two different contexts: as a **trustor(agent)** and as a **trustee(agent)**. In the **trustor's** role, an **agent** representing the **organisation** tries to determine whether it is beneficial for the **organisation** to trust another **organisation** (or **agent**, as the case may be) in a particular context. In the **trustee's** role, the **organisation** and its representatives try to encourage the trust of other **organisations** and **agents** by various **means**. In our trust ontology, we focus on describing the **trustor** role.

Definitions of trust in the literature vary according to the context they are used in [12, 15, 18]. Some research efforts focus on trust as a subjective belief about positive attributes of the trustee. From the management perspective, however, a more concrete approach is beneficial. We define trust as- *The extent to which the trustor is willing to participate in a given business action with a given trustee, considering the risks and incentives involved.* This definition of trust includes the subjective belief as one motivator to trust, while other motivators may depend on the general context as well. The trust ontology built on this conceptual approach is depicted in Figure 2.

Trust is a strong **influencer** between the **Trustor** and **Trustee**. It is the basis for **Trust Decisions** that concern the participation in certain **Guarded Actions(business actions)**. The general trustworthiness of the trustee is built on **Experience(influencer)**, which can be gained internally or reported by external sources. The body of experience is assessed in a **Reputation Evaluation(assessment)**. For example, a number of experiences on the trustee delivering excellent quality products but the being late can be evaluated as a low trustworthiness on timeliness, but high on quality products. The context determines which of these attributes would be more important for a given **Trust Decision**.

Participation in a **Guarded Action** also involves **Probable Costs/Benefits** (potential impact) depending on the behaviour of the trustee and the estimated cost or benefits resulting from it. These are assessed in a tactical **Risk Evaluation(assessment)**, which aims to determine what the probabilities and effects of different outcomes are. There are also some **Known Outcomes(end)** that depend only on the **business decision**. For example, following or violating a contract that governs the **Guarded Action** leads to— the cost of a contract violation may be lower than the predicted outcome of doing business with an ill-reputed trustee, but it must be evaluated as a part of the **Trust Decision**.

5 Business Contract Risk Ontology

The primary goal for Enterprise systems is to conduct profitable business with other enterprises. Such transactions are covered by legal contracts and other regulatory bodies. The Multi Tier Contract Ontology [10] is one of many contemporary researches in the field of conceptualising the domain of business contracts from different perspectives. We do not discuss those "functional"




Fig. 3. Excerpt from Business Contract Risk Ontology

aspects in this paper. Instead, we focus on one of the non-functional aspects related to the business contract and the enterprise—that of Business Risks undertaken in a given contract. Business contracts act to specify expected behavior, describes course of actions for possible non-conformance to agreement. But they also state explicitly the kinds of risks undertaken and determine the options available for resolving situations, in the event such a risk is actualised. Mechanisms for assessing and controlling such risks has been discussed by Kabilan and Weigand [11]. We capture some of these concepts in our non-functional sub-ontology for Business Contract Risk. The contracts are aimed to split such "risks" on who will bear it, how much, to what extent and so forth.

Business Risk (Assessment) acts on a set of **planned activities** which utilizes or consumes and produces a set of **Resources** (business objects). This **business risk** is always borne by an **actor(agent)** who acts on behalf of the enterprise concerned. Every **business process** or action is expected to result in a certain **outcome** (State of Affairs). This outcome may be the expected result, in which case all is well, and we have **predicted outcome(outcome)**. The outcome may be **unexpected outcome** in the eventuality of an undesired result. For example, in the case of a loss of revenue(**unexpected outcome**) due to currency fluctuation (**external influencer**) the **risk event** is the change of currency rate. In short, the **business risk** is said to occur when there is a **planned activity** which does not produce the **predicted outcome** or Results. The outcome is inspected **valuation** by the actor to ascertain whether the **unexpected outcome** is an acceptable state of affairs or not. The business decision involved is the risk

mitigation control. This requires that a countermeasure be adopted to limit the effects of the risk.

6 Threat and Misuse Ontology




Fig. 4. Excerpt from Threat and Misuse Ontology

A central concept in the Threat and Misuse ontology [7, 8] is **system**, which is the entity that can be misused and threatened. A **system** does not include only software, hardware and networks, but also facilities, organisation, administrators, maintainers and users. A **system** can be decomposed into components that are themselves systems, thereby forming a hierarchy. Components of a system that need to be protected are called **assets**. In the ontology, we introduce a class **system** with a subclass **system component**. Three subclasses of system components are identified: **asset**, **actor**, **misuser**.

There are two kinds of **goals** for a system, **business goals** and **quality goals**. A **business goal** is a goal on the business level and tells why a system is introduced and used. A **quality goal** describes a general non-functional requirement that a system has to satisfy, and it is composed of one **asset** and one **quality attribute**. Some high level examples of **quality attributes**

are reliability, usability, portability and efficiency. Note that, in contrast to BMM, we here make explicit which system a particular goal is defined for.

It may be the case that a goal is not fulfilled for some reason; such a situation is called a quality deficiency if it concerns a quality goal and a business damage if it concerns a business goal. For example, if there is a quality goal of high availability of data, there may be quality deficiencies like corrupted data or manipulation of data and hardware.

Business and quality goals may be directly threatened by certain business actions, which are called misuses. The actor (agent) who carries out this misuse is therefore a misuser. An example could be unauthorized access to classified data. Vulnerability (influencer) is a property of a component of a system that makes it vulnerable (weakness) to threats, e.g. a design flaw or a flaw in the software development process. Misuses, vulnerabilities, and quality deficiencies can be grouped together into misuse cases that describe entire scenarios of misuses. Such a scenario (called the misuse case) includes a misuser who exploits some vulnerability of a system and carries out a misuse resulting in a quality deficiency. Misuses can be countered by means of countermeasures, which are requirements on a system, its development, maintenance or operation, which support quality goals. Countermeasures are aimed at detecting, preventing or mitigating misuse cases.

7 Privacy Ontology




Fig. 5. Excerpt from Privacy Ontology

In this global age, when more and more enterprises are conducting business via the Internet and other electronic media, also privacy and information security come to the forefront. Of these two important non-functional aspects we consider in this section issues related to privacy of information and data that an enterprise processes. Every enterprise has to be aware of the governing privacy laws, privacy recommendations [16, 14] and its own policy on how it will handle requests for data/information. For example, if the enterprise is requested for some specific data regarding some person or enterprise, it is the onus of the enterprise owning this data to take a privacy-aware decision based on the background of who is sending the request, and for what purpose the request is being made. To give an example, if the enterprise is given a request for a photograph of one of its own employees, it is the duty of the enterprise to check (a) if it has a policy that it may give out such photographs to external agencies without the permission of the employee (whose photograph it is) or check if the employee has given her consent on an external access on the photograph, (b) check the credentials of the agency making such a request, and (c) assess the stated use (intent) of the requester. The privacy ontology in Figure 5 deals primarily with the non-functional aspect of how data in information systems are used in specific contexts. Every organisation should have a **privacy policy** that protects the **data(business object)** which is owned by the **data owner(agent)**. Note that the **business object** and **agent(actor)** are the concepts identified from our Common NFA Ontology (Figure 1)- Another actor in this ontology is the **Data Requester**, who is the actor who wishes to procure the **data** and use it for a specific **purpose**. The **data** that is requested is usually about some **actor, agent, or business enterprise**. In our model, these are modeled as the **Data Targets**. The story begins with the **Data Owner** collecting the **data** about the **data targets** for a stated **purpose(objective)**. The **data target** has to give its **consent** on how the **data** can be used, so that no privacy laws, regulations etc. are violated. The **Consent** may be stereotyped as a **Business Object**, and the process by which **data target** gives its consent as a **business process**. The **Data owner** has a privacy policy that it follows whenever a **Data requester** sends in a **Request for Data**. The **Data requester** sends a **Request** (stereotyped as a **Business Object** and also states his **Intent** for the use of the requested **Data**. The **Intent** is modelled as an **Influencer**. The **Data owner**, on receipt of the request makes a **Privacy-aware decision**, modelled as a **business decision**, processing the request based on the **privacy policy**, the **Consent** of the **Data target**, and the credentials and the stated intent of the **Data requester**. Also the **Purpose** the data was originally collected for can influence the **privacy-aware decision**. The **Privacy-aware decision result**, stereotyped as a **business decision result**, can be either request granted or denied. The **Data requester** is informed of the subsequent decision.

8 Discussion of Results

In this paper, we have discussed only the overview of the individual sub ontologies. Hence detailed description of all the concepts, their usage has not been in the scope. A detailed technical description of each individual NFA ontology will be discussed in separate papers. The Common NFA is still evolving and this process is visualized to be an iterative one. Some of the future work envisioned are:

- To incorporate all non-functional aspects sub-ontologies.
- To carry out field studies and apply the proposed set of ontologies in other domains.
- To align with business process modelling and other efforts at enterprise interoperability.

9 Conclusion

As stated in Section 1, our objective was to establish a shared explicit model for non-functional aspects. In this paper, we have elucidated on the top level generic ontology, Common Non-Functional Ontology. We have illustrated its utility by means of some individual non-functional ontologies. Our next step is to put forward specific details and descriptions of each sub- ontology along with instantiated facts from our ongoing case study analysis. The Common NFA and its related sub-ontologies, shall form a knowledge base which can be used for fostering interoperability, and reuse across enterprise systems.

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