Re: [RFC] prevention of syscalls from writable segments, breaking bug exploits
Steven Walter (email@example.com)
Wed, 3 Jan 2001 16:05:28 -0600
On Wed, Jan 03, 2001 at 04:54:38PM -0500, Alexander Viro wrote:
> On Wed, 3 Jan 2001, Dan Aloni wrote:
> > It is known that most remote exploits use the fact that stacks are
> > executable (in i386, at least).
> > On Linux, they use INT 80 system calls to execute functions in the kernel
> > as root, when the stack is smashed as a result of a buffer overflow bug in
> > various server software.
> > This preliminary, small patch prevents execution of system calls which
> > were executed from a writable segment. It was tested and seems to work,
> > without breaking anything. It also reports of such calls by using printk.
> Get real. Attacker can set whatever registers he needs and jump to one
> of the many instances of int 0x80 in libc. There goes your protection.
> Win: 0
> Loss: cost of find_vma() (and down(&mm->mmap_sem), BTW) on every system
> And the reason to apply that patch would be...?
Should be a moot point, anyway, as x86 has a seperate stack for each
priviledge level. Even if the kernel somehow tried to execute code in a
lower priviledge segment (stack or otherwise) shouldn't a GPF get
"Voters decide nothing. Vote counters decide everything."
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to firstname.lastname@example.org
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/