Re: PATCH: "Kernel Insider" (security optimization)

[David Wagner]

>Its a linux kernel modification, that allows to decide wich uid, pid or
>file can open a tcp socket in listening state.

- Putting access control on listen() [rather than socket()/bind()]
  seems like a really bad idea.  In particular, in some cases one can
  bind to a port and receive messages on it without ever calling listen(),
  if I am not mistaken.

- The use of sock_i_uid(sock) seems poorly chosen; if sock->socket==NULL,
  then your module will mistakenly think that the action was requested by
  uid 0.  In general, the return value from sock_i_uid() cannot be trusted
  for permission checks for several reasons.  Why don't you simply use
  current->euid for your permission checks?

- Checking pid's doesn't seem like a good idea.  If a process listed in
  allowed_pids dies, then some other malicious process can wrap the pid
  space and take over that trusted pid, thereby subverting your access
  control policy.

- Are you aware of previous work on this subject?  In particular, you
  might enjoy checking out the Janus project, which is a much more general
  implementation of this idea: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~daw/janus/

- You should really join the mailing list hosted by Crispin Cowan working
  to develop kernel hooks for this sort of kernel security modification.