Re: Duplicate '..' in /lib

J Troy Piper (jtp@dok.org)
Mon, 16 Jul 2001 03:16:56 -0500


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> As it turns out, the extraneous '..' is actually a file. I did a rm ..*,
> which left the original .. directory alone but removed the .. file. Did a
> e2fsck on reboot, no problems found.
>=20

Yes, good to remove the file, but now my main concern is that your system=
=20
may have been compromised as the old ".." dir-not-really file entry may=20
have other connotations. It is definately a possibility of a cracked=20
system (as the .. file appears in many new r00tkit type exploits.) i would=
=20
do some extensive forensics on the machine in question. are there new=20
entries in /etc/passwd or /etc/shadow that shouldn't be there? =20

DISCLAIMER - I am not insisting your machine was compromised, but why be=20
lax about it? Check the system in every way possible to determine if=20
someone has cracked and installed a r00tkit on your box. just getting rid=
=20
of the single .. entry may not be enough. look for other suspicious=20
files, keep copies of them before deleting the ones available to the=20
public in /lib or /usr or whatever, and check out any suspicious files=20
that were created/modified/accessed in the same window (5 or 6 minuites)=20
as the double .. entry in /lib

it sounds to me like someone MAY have been trying to replace system lib=20
files, or even perhaps load malicious kernel code in modules. at my job,=
=20
this system would be immediately taken off the 'production line' until a=20
thorough examination/investigation can be done. check logins around the=20
ctime of the original .. creation and compare with who was logged in etc=20
etc.

this may be nothing, it may be a nasty kernel bug, or it may be malicious=
=20
hackers attampting to pull the wool over your eyes.

be PARANOID in any situation in which your machine MAY have been=20
compromised and persue the forensic evidence until you hit a titanium
wall (a brick wall can be easily broken down).=20

If you have no idea where to go from here, send me email logs of what has=
=20
been found and i will give it my best shot at determining whether this is=
=20
a kernel bug (which i would assume would've been caught and dealt with by=
=20
now), or a nasty attack involving a rootkit, so the 'attackers' can regain=
=20
access to the system.

Start with "netstat --inet -a" and see if you find any open ports that=20
shouldn't be open. That would be the first indication of a rootkit that=20
allows the rootkitter (person installing the rootkit) to regain access to=
=20
the system even after it has been 'locked down'. =20

rootkits are well know for leaving SEVERAL backdoors so that if one is=20
found, the attacker still has multiple ways to re-enter and re-penetrate=20
the system.=20

----
J Troy Piper
jtp@dok.org

PS - sorry about the FUD slam about 'the evil cracker' but we all know=20
they DO exist, and the weaker the admin, the easier it is to take=20
advantage of the systems under the admin's control.

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