No, of course not. It's not a silver bullet, but it's still a useful tool.
(I assumed this would be obvious?)
>In any given case, physical access renders most solutions void or
>significantly paled.
No, I dispute this. I keep giving examples where encrypted swap can still
be useful even (or especially) when there is a risk that an attacker might
gain access to the machine occasionally. I like to think my examples should
have been pretty clear, but if not, please ask, and I'll be happy to
elaborate on whichever point you found unclear.
(It is certainly true that if the attacker will have continuous physical
access to your machine in eternity, security is impossible, and encrypted
swap doesn't help. But this doesn't change anything: This is not the
typical threat model, and there are very common scenarios where encrypted
swap *does* seem likely to help.)
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