Re: [PATCH] remove sys_security

[Crispin Cowan]

This is an OpenPGP/MIME signed message (RFC 2440 and 3156)
--------------enigE5DA74FC7419581687B3DC38
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit

David S. Miller wrote:

>Anything which passes a completely opaque value through a system
>call is a sign of trouble, design wise.
>
That's interesting. Passing a completely opaque value (actually an 
integer) through the system call was exactly what we designed it to do, 
because we saw a design need for pecisely that: so that applications 
with awareness of a specific module can talk to the module.

Could you elaborate on why this is a sign of trouble, design wise?

>There is simply no way we can enfore proper portable typing by
>all these security module authors such that we can do any kind
>of proper 32-bit/64-bit syscall translation on the ports that
>need to do this.
>
THAT I would love to hear about. If all we have to do to save 
sys_security is change its signature, that'd be great.

>If we do things such as the fs stacking or fs filter ideas,
>that eliminates a whole swath of the facilities the security_ops
>"provide".  No ugly syscalls passing opaque types through the kernel
>to some magic module, but rather a real facility that is useful
>to many things other than LSM.
>
Yes, that will be wonderful. And the LSM team will be pleased to re-work 
the desing when stackable file systems appear and we can take advantage 
of them.

Crispin

--------------enigE5DA74FC7419581687B3DC38
Content-Type: application/pgp-signature

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v1.0.6 (GNU/Linux)
Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org

iD8DBQE9r8bo5ZkfjX2CNDARAUbhAJ9AF/j5AfE1C0jyvZ3VXF0f/xey8wCgpYp8
oYE696LCdKVsgvBPyMDbRrQ=
=ciE8
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

--------------enigE5DA74FC7419581687B3DC38--