Re: can chroot be made safe for non-root?

[Martin Josefsson]

On Tue, 2002-10-22 at 16:15, Shaya Potter wrote:

> from vserver patch
> 
> diff -rc2P linux-2.4.19/fs/namei.c linux-2.4.19ctx-14/fs/namei.c
> *** linux-2.4.19/fs/namei.c     Tue Aug  6 15:02:24 2002
> --- linux-2.4.19ctx-14/fs/namei.c       Sun Oct 13 23:58:55 2002
> ***************
> *** 153,156 ****
> --- 153,165 ----
>         umode_t                 mode = inode->i_mode;
>   
> +       /*
> +               A dir with permission bit all 0s is a dead zone for
> +               process running in a vserver. By doing
> +                       chmod 000 /vservers
> +               you fix the "escape from chroot" bug.
> +       */
> +       if ((mode & 0777) == 0
> +               && S_ISDIR(mode)
> +               && current->s_context != 0) return -EACCES;
>         if (mask & MAY_WRITE) {
>                 /*
> 
> I don't think that will work, especially as it seems vserver's dont
> nest.

This was just a quick and dirty fix to prevent root in a vserver from
breaking out into the "real server", that's it. chroot() inside a
vserver works exactly the same way as without vservers.

One negative sideeffect is that root in a vserver can't access any
directory with all 0s in the permission bits. But that's better than
having root in a vserver being able to go out into the "real server".

I'm not saying this is a very good solution but I think it at least does
what it's supposed to do in a dirty way.

-- 
/Martin

Never argue with an idiot. They drag you down to their level, then beat
you with experience.