I believe a script signs the files on ftp.kernel.org, which means the
private key is on the master machine, probably without a pass phrase.
That means that if the master server is compromised, its highly likely
that a rogue file will have a correct signature.
As hpa says, the GPG signature provides no assurance that Linus put
up patch-2.5.60.bz2 and not some random other person.
The only way to be completely sure is for Linus to gpg-sign the patches
himself at source with a known gpg key using a secure pass phrase before
they leave his machine (preferably before the machine is connected to
the 'net to upload them for the really paranoid.)
-- Russell King (email@example.com) The developer of ARM Linux http://www.arm.linux.org.uk/personal/aboutme.html
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