> The following patch was originaly for 2.0.32 by solar@false.com.
> I ported it to 2.1.71 and separated it from another patch that
> came with it.
>
> This isnt a good fix in some ways. Firstly there are programs
> that depend upon symlinks in /tmp,
Not symlinks to files owned by other non-root users.
> secondly it doesnt seem to agree with the unix standard.
>
> Thats not to say it isnt a good toy to have around on an insecure
> box, but it shouldnt be a standard thing.
I think it is OK:
The implementation may require that the calling
process has permission to access the existing file.
What "access" might be is not specified, so I think we can
at least require read-write access. I think that standard
was made vague to allow for this sort of feature.
There are other neat features that are legal too.
Hidden files are OK, since stat() may lie:
the system may deny the existence of the file specified