> I was thinking about it today and I think the way the problem is solved
> right now is not good. A user can make an symlink intended for an attack
> without any complaints by the kernel. Then if root tries to write to a
> file in /tmp that has been redirected with a user symlink, a permission
> denied results and the script to be run by root fails. Not good.
Why would you want root to follow that symlink? Isn't that the point of
the patch?...to try to be a bandaid for badly written programs/scripts
that deal with files in /tmp?
> And maybe the functionality should be switchable on and off by writing to
> a file in /proc/sys/kernel/xxxx ?
That would allow more people to give it a try knowing that if it horribly
breaks program X, they can quickly disable the feature.
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