Tuomas Tanner
Linguistics Essay
Academic Writing
November 5th, 2001
When Berlin and Kay introduced basic color terms in their 1969 book Basic color terms: their universality and evolution, a new way of thinking about colors and color terms had begun. The predominant view of linguistic relativity gave way to cross-cultural color universals that could be identified for all languages. The Berlin and Kay 1969 study was widely accepted and it became a landmark which later studies built on.
The notions presented in this 1969 study have naturally been augmented and given new clarification, but the basic thesis has been widely accepted until just recently, when some scholars have begun to question the validity of universal color categories and basic color terms. The opponents of universal color categories contest this theory by claiming that color terms are socio-lingual objects rather than absolutes defined by our physiology. This sharp contrast raises a question - which theory is correct? Can the theory of color universals withstand the critique of new cultural relativists?
In this paper, I will present the Berlin and Kay theory (1969) and developments to this theory by Kay and McDaniel (1978). I will also look at an opposing view (Saunders 2000) and discuss the issues raised by this critique.
In 1969 Brent Berlin and Paul Kay devised their seminal theory of color universals that proved the existence of semantic universals in color vocabulary. Even more importantly, this theory also mapped out the evolutionary development of color terms for all languages (1969:7). Berlin and Kay collected experimental data from 20 languages using native speakers of these languages. They extracted the basic color terms of a language and then mapped these terms to a chart of fully saturated color chips (1969: 5).
Berlin and Kay performed two conceptual maneuvers that allowed them to overcome the problems caused by large variation in the number of color terms used in different languages and the seeming irregularity of color space which a color term represented (1969). Berlin and Kay used very strict criteria to define a basic color term (1969: 9). They also focused their research on the foci of colors where consensus on a color term was the highest (1969: 10).
By limiting the field of study with these maneuvers, Berlin and Kay were able to discover a very limited and universal set of color terms in all languages that they studied. They found out that all languages drew their color terms from a set of only eleven color categories, and that the foci of these color terms were same for all languages (1969: 2). They also found that all languages acquired their basic color terms in a fixed sequence of seven evolutionary stages (1969: 14). If a language encoded a color, all colors from the previous stages had to be encoded (1969: 14).
Kay and McDaniel (1978) further developed the original 1969 theory by incorporating the study of perceptual physiology to explain the universality of basic color categories. Fuzzy set theory and the formalism of fuzzy logic were used to explain the way in which languages acquired their basic color terms.
As a result of these developments, Kay and McDaniel (1978: 639) mapped out an improved model of color term acquisition where the different stages resulted from fuzzy unions and fuzzy intersections of primary basic color categories. These primary basic color categories are derived from a three-cone system in the retina (1978: 618-626).
Barbara Saunders contests the theory of universal color categories and basic color terms common to all languages in her paper "Revisiting basic color terms" (2000). She (2000) proposes that Berlin and Kay only worked against the Whorfian hypothesis of linguistic relativity in their experimental practicE. She claims that the Berlin and Kay study was constructed in a way which made results seem self evident when they were deduced from prior commitments and that research techniques were effaced and data "cleaned" (Saunders 2000). Finally, she declares that the Berlin and Kay thesis is built on layers of mistakes which produce misinterpretations of both color science and intercultural relations.
Saunders (2000) bases her attack on the Berlin and Kay theory on the fact that they concentrated only on the foci of colors leaving the boundaries untouched. Berlin and Kay stated (1969: 2) that this was necessary in order to gain insight on the common characteristics of color terms. Saunders (2000) believes that this decision was done because Berlin and Kay needed to contest the Whorfian hypotheses and the only possible way to do this was to over-simplify the field of study. She proposes that this maneuver is the underlying cause for errors made in the experiments and the wrong deduction of Berlin and Kay and others who refined their original thesis.
Saunders (2000) does not believe in the Kay and McDaniel addition of fuzzy set theory, but cites other researchers from the 1970's who used different approaches to color term study and who managed to create "natural" boundaries in color space. She also attacks (2000) the tests Berlin and Kay performed using fully saturated Munsell color chips. She states (2000) that the chips are culturally biased and that responses to these chips are crude and cannot be used as a basis for thesis or to support theories.
Saunders is clearly leading an attack against basic color terms. She is a strong supporter of the relativist view and considers the color universals as threatening the cultural diversity of our planet. She bases her strong arguments in the methodological decisions that Berlin and Kay made when formulating their theory. She tries to find fault in these decisions, but I am not convinced.
Although Saunders (2000) boasts an impressive list of references, she fails to provide justification for the key claims she is making. When Saunders (2000) contests the decision to concentrate on the foci of color terms, the only researchers she finds to back her claims are from the same era as the original Berlin and Kay theory. She dismisses the additions made by Kay and McDaniel (1978), which provide a more recent and logically sound solution in the form of fuzzy boundaries. Although her other claim of color chip experiments being crude has merit, I do not believe that this crudeness is prohibitive for making observations. Furthermore, Saunders does not back her other claim of the Munsell color chips as being culturally biased in any way.
The Berlin and Kay theory has endured for more than 30 years in the scientific community. It has been adopted in linguistics and in color category research, even Saunders (2000) acknowledges this. I do not believe that the theory of color universals has endured only because of the fraternal spirit of mutual embrace in the scientific community as Saunders bitterly claims (2000). The theory of basic color terms is on solid ground and latest research has not refuted its stance, rather refined the original idea and gained new insight on the mechanisms underlying our color perception. Saunders seems a cultural relativist who wishes to keep universality at an arm's length. She does not, however, make a compelling case in refuting the universality of color categories. The basic color terms have stood their test.
Berlin, Brent and Paul Kay (1969) Basic color terms: their universality and evolution. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Kay, Paul and Chad McDaniel (1978) The linguistic significance of the meanings of color terms. Language 54, 610-646.
Saunders, Barbara (2000) Revisiting basic color terms. Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 6, 81-99.