

Securebox A Platform for Smarter and **Safer Networks**

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- Agenda
- Motivation
- Goals
- Platform:
 - Design, Architecture, Deployment, Implementation
- Use cases
- Challenges & State of the art



Motivation

- Bring Your Own Device in Enterprises.
- Lack of coordination for network management.



Passersby

Insecure SOHO Networks

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Internet of (too many)Things



Use Network data for improving network

(Not so) efficient use of terabytes of network data.



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- Low Cost.
 - Can be deployed at SOHO.
- Easy to manage and deploy.
 - Does not need professionals.
- Scalable.
 - Use as much you want, Pay as much you use.
- Robust.
 - Self improving and healing
- Interactive.
 - Better user experience



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Design

- Network Management and Security as a Service.
- Decoupling middleboxes from the network.
 - Automated configuration updates for software based middleboxes.
- Global view of the network for better management and analysis.
- Automated management, threat detection and configuration at network vantage points.
- Proactive, collaborative security
- Notifications about network operations, threats (network and devices) etc.



Architecture: Securebox (Sensor at the edge)

SDN-capable access point for network edge.



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Architecture Security and Management Service

- Security and Management Service
 - User management.
 - Device management.
 - Service mobility.
 - Device roaming across APs.
 - Collaborative Security
 - Micro security services and virtualized middlebox deployment.
 - Network traffic data analysis.







Phone

Algorithm 1 Securebox traffic flow processing algorithm initialization

while $traffic_flow_request$ do

```
metadata \leftarrow extractMetadata(traffic_flow)
```

else

```
 \begin{array}{l} policy \leftarrow getSecurityPolicy(metadata)\\ generateOFRule(matchingPolicy)\\ insertFlow(OF\_switch,traffic\_flow\_request)\\ updatePolicyDB(policy)\\ updateLog(event)\\ \end{array}
```

 \mathbf{end}

 \mathbf{end}



Internet



Low Cost

 Security and Management as a Service based solution with minimal hardware required.

Easy to manage and deploy

- Automated management with minimal configuration.
- Scalable
 - Cloud resources to scale.
- Robust
 - Automated analysis, self learning system (with minimal supervision).
- Interactive
 - User involvement through feedback and notification.





Securebox as AP

Securebox as SuperAP

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Implementation Securebox

- Hardware
 - FitPC3 (Mobicom, 2015)
 - Raspberry PI (SEC, 2016).
- Floodlight SDN Controller
- Open vSwitch



- Lightweight policy storage (file-based, SQLite).
- Can be included in IoT hubs.



Architecture Security and Management Service

- Web application
 - User, Device, Securebox management.
 - Network policy management.
- Mobile device notifications.
- Amazon, Google, Azure cloud.
- Kubernetes cluster (Lauri Suomalainen)
 - Docker containers.



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Home and Small Office Networks Deployment Preferences

- Securebox deployed as APs.
 - Sensors in edge networks.
 - Data collection.
- SMS maintained by a service provider
 - User subscribes to the services.
 - Micro (security) services.
 - Leased middleboxes for traffic analysis.

Home and Small Office Networks Advantages

- Automated Network management.
- Enterprise grade security for SOHO users.
- Better device, network management.
 - Data usage, data privacy.
- Block botnet, spam, ransomware.
- User interactive system.
 - Notifications, updates, feedback.



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Enterprise Environments Deployment Preferences

- Securebox
 - Replace APs at network vantage points.
- SMS
 - Centrally managed.
 - In-house deployment for better privacy.



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Enterprise Environments Advantages

- Central control over the network.
 - Less management overhead.
 - Less human resource required; automated configuration updates.
- Coherent network policies across enterprise.
 - Avoid configuration loopholes.
- Lower deployment costs.
- Efficient use of enterprise network traffic data.
- Better scalability of networking security infrastructure i.e. Middleboxes.



Setting up secure Wi-Fi environments

- Problem:
 - Leakage of shared PSK from compromised IoT device.
- Solution
 - Using device specific PSKs e.g. Private PSK, Dynamic PSK.
 - Still does not block device impersonation attacks.
- Securebox
 - Supports device specific PSK with dynamic access control and other security services.
 - Attacker using device impersonation will get limited access.



Research Use cases

- Setting up Testbeds
 - Network models.
 - IoT Environments.
- Testing performance of malware, botnet, spam detection approaches.
- Develop and testing of software based middleboxes.



SWENbox: Software-defined Wearable Network with Security Analysis

- Goals.
 - Big trust from little things.
 - Run-time secure pairing, device associations, resource sharing, secure D2D communications.
 - Secure sensing and privacy for wearable devices.





SWENbox Features

- Software-defined networking for wearables.
 - Secure interactions with untrusted IoT devices.
 - Selective isolation of compromised devices.
- Using context-sensing for:
 - Second-factor authentication.
 - Trust ensemble using cloud analytics.
 - Contextual fencing
- Mitigate impersonation, replay attacks.w



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- Latency
 - Traffic is analyzed remotely → Design choices (Policy database updates & local cache (Zipf's Law))
- Privacy
 - Remote analysis of user data \rightarrow Use minimal data from user
- Attacks against the system
 - Rogue secureboxes launching DDoS → Logging & anomaly detection.
 - Request for falsified traffic queries → Human/ Automated supervision, feedback loop
- False positives
 - Threat and Malware analysis → Feedback loop, incentivized learning

State of the Art

- Remote deployment of middleboxes.
 - J. Sherry et al. (SIGCOMM, 2012); C. Lan et al. (NSDI, 2016); SENSS (SIGCOMM, 2014)
- Middlebox as a Service.
 - Blackbox (SIGCOMM, 2015); DPI-as-a-Service (CoNEXT, 2014)
- Improving Home Networks.
 - N. Feamster (HomeNets, 2010); Tialong et al., (HotNets 2015); T. Zachariah (HotMobile, 2015); uCap (Ubicomp, 2012); SpaceHub (HotNets, 2015); Contextual Router (SOSR, 2016)
- IoT Security.
 - Z. K. Zhang et al. (ASIA-CCS, 2015); C. Liu et al. (Elsevier, 2014); E. Farnandes (SOSP, 2016)



Google onHub \$199 https://on.google.com/hub/

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Dojo \$99 https://www.dojo-labs.com/product/dojo/#



Air gapped (isolated) networks weaknesses

- Isolated and dedicated.
- Difficult to setup and maintain.
- What happens when the attacker is in the network?
 - Nothing 😕



Thank You

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File tranfer performance over HTTP and FTP



File Transfer Performance over Bittorrent

HELSINGIN YLIOPISTO HELSINGFORS UNIVERSITET UNIVERSITY OF HELSINKI Faculty of Science Department of Computer Science File1 (1136 MB)

Network SB (FitPC)

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File2 (212 MB)

SB (Raspberry-PI)





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- <u>https://s3.amazonaws.com/ydtimages/~yourdai7/wp</u> -content/uploads/2016/03/09094045/iot.jpg
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