> On Mon, 2002-08-26 at 15:58, Thunder from the hill wrote:
>> I personally like the task->cred->cr_uid, etc. approach. Helps
>> a lot.
> It changes the whole semantics of every security test in Linux,
> and breaks most of them totally. Our syscalls know the uid is
> constant during the call
Right. Most people appear to prefer to make a lunge straight for
CLONE_CRED.
One of the first steps should rather be to build up support for a
copy-on-write BSD-style 'ucred' struct that can be passed around the
VFS.
Without the latter there is no way to ensure that the compound VFS
operations such as, say, lookup(), followed by a call to permission()
followed by a call to dentry_open(), ->readpage(), etc. all use the
same creds. This they *have* to do irrespective of whether or not the
process is using CLONE_CRED, or you might end up using one set of
privileges for the security checks and a different set for the actual
file/device ops...
Once those VFS changes have been done and audited, then one can start
to add support for 'pcreds' a.k.a. process credentials and then
finally CLONE_CRED...
Cheers,
Trond
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