Linux-kernel mailing list archive 2000-15,: Re: Proposal "LUID"

# Re: Proposal "LUID"

Linda Walsh (law@sgi.com)
Fri, 14 Apr 2000 21:18:40 -0700

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"Albert D. Cahalan" wrote:
> So you only need one system call for this. No CAP_* bit required.
>
> int sysluid(int arg){
> int old = current->luid;
> if(old) return old;
> current->luid = arg;
> return arg;
> }
>
> If login fails to set LUID then, yes, normal users can mess with it.
> This is OK because your system wasn't using it anyway.

    ---
    	I like it, unfortunately it won't do everything I need.  1) init should start up
    with LUID==-1 (it's not a valid login ID).  2)  Account 0 should be audited when
    root logs in.  In the above implementation you are relying on root having privileged
    status.  In a capability based system 'root' is just another user to be monitored
    and may have no privilege.

    -l

    --
    Linda A Walsh                    | Trust Technology, Core Linux, SGI
    law@sgi.com                      | Voice: (650) 933-5338

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