I'm not sure. One possible attack would be to try to change your entropy
pool by sending packets in the right frequency,
also e.g. regular broadcasts may not have enough jitter. One possible fix
for that would be to use a secure random generator with a secret that selects
which packets to get information from etc, but there may be again attacks
with that.
When you're really paranoid use a hardware rnd.
>
> > The randomness generation in scsi/* is also not used, because SMART2 bypasses
> > the SCSI layer completely.
>
> Is there randomness generation from scsi/* then? It's a 2.2.x series here.
Make your own conclusions (end_request is normally used by drivers to tell
the upper layers that it finished an IO)
#if ! SCSI_BLK_MAJOR(MAJOR_NR) && (MAJOR_NR != COMPAQ_SMART2_MAJOR)
static void end_request(int uptodate) {
struct request *req = CURRENT;
if (end_that_request_first(req, uptodate, DEVICE_NAME))
return;
#ifndef DEVICE_NO_RANDOM
add_blkdev_randomness(MAJOR(req->rq_dev));
#endif
-Andi
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