That wouldn't happen when you were using a secure PRNG to select the
interrupts to get data from, or ? You just have to make sure that the
PRNG initial state is not seeded from the network or anything else the
attacker could guess.
Well, the question I thought that was being asked was why wasn't the
interrupts from NIC's feeding in entropy by default into the /dev/random
pool.
I'm not sure what you mean about using a secure PRNG to select the
interrupts to get data from; there's a bootstrapping issue here, and
even if you do use a PRNG to select whether or not a particular entropy
is sampled, that decision only contributes one bit of entropy into the
pool.....
- Ted
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